



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
Fertility, Public Policy, and 

















Chapter 4 (pp. 105-132) in: 
The Economics of Work and Family 
Jean Kimmel, and Emily P. Hoffman, eds. 





Copyright ©2002. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
105
4
Fertility, Public Policy, 
and Mothers 




Few policy debates draw more attention or more heated discussion
than those concerning population policy.  Many countries have strug-
gled to influence their birth rates.  Countries such as Germany, France,
and Sweden have instigated a variety of policies to deal with low birth
rates, while other countries such as India, Singapore, and China have
had varying degrees of success with policies to reduce their birth rates.
The United States has also experienced below-replacement fertility in
recent decades, but it has not implemented explicit pronatalist policies
as many other industrialized countries have done.  Most U.S. popula-
tion policy is centered on controlling immigration.  Nevertheless,
recent research on the economics of fertility has demonstrated that the
United States does indeed have policies that have an impact, whether
intended or not, on the birth rate.  For example, recent research has
determined that tax exemptions for children, welfare benefits, family
planning funded by Medicaid benefits, and company-provided mater-
nity leave all exert statistically significant effects on fertility.  Interest-
ingly, the policies that lower the cost of raising a child (such as taxes
and maternity leave), were not specifically designed to affect fertility,
whereas the polices that have an antinatalist effect (such as certain pro-
visions related to welfare reform and Medicaid-funded family plan-
ning) were in fact designed to lower birth rates among specific













At the same time that some of these policies have been enacted,
expanded, and/or modified, the U.S. total fertility rate has remained
remarkably constant and hovers just below replacement (Figure 1).1
The constant overall total fertility rate does mask the fact that the teen-
age birth rate in the United States is quite high and has only recently
shown signs of declining (Figure 2).2 Although the overall birth rate in
the United States has remained fairly constant over the past two
decades, during this time period there has been tremendous growth in
the labor force participation of women, particularly women with young
children (Figure 3).  As of 1994, the labor force participation rate of
married women with preschool-aged children was virtually identical to
that of married women with older children (Hotz, Klerman, and Willis,
1997).  This increase in the labor force participation rate of married
women with children has generated much discussion as to how govern-
ment and business can and/or should ease the dual burden of work and
family that falls primarily on women. 
In this chapter I explore two related areas of research.  The first is
the effect of public policies on the birth rate in the United States.  I
focus on the fertility effects of taxes, welfare, Medicaid, and maternity
leave.  Because these policies have the potential to influence birth
rates, and because economists view fertility and labor force participa-
Figure 1 Total Fertility Rate

































Figure 2 Teen Birth Rate per 1,000 Women in Specified Group
Figure 3 Female Labor Force Participation Rates
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tion as simultaneous, I also examine the labor force participation of
mothers.  In particular, I focus on two issues related to mothers in the
labor force.  The first revolves around continued reports in the popular
press that professional women are fleeing the workforce due to con-
flicting work and family roles.  Although most of the evidence on this
topic is anecdotal, it has the potential to lead employers to believe that
women with children are not committed to the workforce, perhaps
leading employers to be less willing to invest in women.  To address
this issue, I report on some of my own research that examines whether
or not professional women are leaving the labor force and returning to
the home to care for their children.  The second issue I explore is the
family pay gap—the earnings differential between women with and
without children.  While the gender pay differential has received much
attention and has narrowed recently, the family pay gap has received
scant attention and has grown in recent decades. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, I outline
the basic economic theory behind the economics of fertility.  Following
that I discuss the effects of various public policies on the fertility of
U.S. women.  In the next section I discuss both the issue of women
returning from the workforce to care for children and the family pay
gap that exists between women with and without children.  In the final
section I offer some concluding remarks. 
THE ECONOMICS OF FERTILITY
To understand how public policies such as income taxes, welfare
reform, and maternity leave can affect fertility, it is useful to begin
with some economic theory.  My discussion is short and nontechnical.3
The economic model of fertility is essentially an extension of neoclas-
sical demand theory.  Parents are assumed to receive utility from chil-
dren (or child quality) as well as from other goods.  Parents are also
assumed to behave rationally and to be perfect contraceptors; that is,
they are effective users of contraception.  Children (or child quality)
can be either produced primarily at home (home-cooked meals, paren-
tal child care) or with goods bought from the market (restaurant meals,
prepared foods, and purchased child care).  Parents maximize their util-
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ity subject to a full-income budget constraint where full income is
defined as that amount of income the household would have if it
devoted all available time to working.  The full-income budget con-
straint thus explicitly includes the hourly wage rate as the opportunity
cost of time.  Therefore, the model recognizes that not only are there
explicit costs of raising a child (diapers, food, etc.), there is a signifi-
cant time cost or opportunity cost associated with raising a child. This
time cost is traditionally borne by the mother.
The model leads to the prediction that the demand for children is a
function of income, prices, tastes, and preferences.  Theoretically, there
is some ambiguity surrounding the potential impact of women’s wages
on fertility due to competing income and price effects.  The general
expectation, however, is that fertility will be negatively associated with
a woman’s wage rate because traditionally women have borne the time
cost of children.  In fact, Schultz (1994) has noted that virtually all eco-
nomic studies of fertility have found a negative relationship between
women’s earnings or women’s education (a good proxy for earnings)
and fertility. 
In the following section I review and discuss research that exam-
ines several specific policies and their effects on fertility in the United
States.   All of these policies change the budget constraint facing the
family because they change the price of a child.  Thus, as parents
weigh the costs and benefits of an additional child, they are assumed to
take into account the change in costs and/or benefits imposed by the
policy under consideration. 
PUBLIC POLICY AND FERTILITY
Taxes and Fertility
As noted above, the economic model of fertility suggests that cou-
ples weigh the financial costs of raising a child together with the time
inputs of parents against the utility gains from having children.  Tax
and transfer payments that vary with family size alter these costs and
benefits and thus are expected to have an effect on the demand for chil-
dren.  Politicians have often stated that increasing the personal exemp-
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tion in the U.S. income tax would decrease the cost of a child.  In the
late 1980s, several economists began noting that tax variables, by
changing the “cost” of a child, could have an impact on fertility.  In one
of the first papers in this vein, Whittington, Alm, and Peters (1990)
examined the possibility of a causal relationship between the value of
the personal exemption in the U.S. income tax and the U.S. total fertil-
ity rate. 
The personal exemption, a feature of the income tax system since
1913, was instituted to provide relief for low-income families from the
burden of taxation.  Thus, the original intent of the personal exemption
was not to subsidize births  (Pechman 1983).  Unlike other policies that
might affect fertility, the personal exemption is an ongoing subsidy that
families receive each year they claim the child as a dependent on their
income tax form.  For most families, this subsidy lasts for at least 18
years.  In 1994, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that the
out-of-pocket expenditures required to raise a child to age 18 amounted
to $136,320.  Whittington, Alm, and Peters report that the personal
exemption actually covers between 4 and 9 percent of the out-of-
pocket costs of a child.  Clearly this is not an inconsequential subsidy. 
Using aggregate time-series data for the United States from the
period 1913–1984, Whittington, Alm, and Peters model the general
fertility rate (the birth rate per thousand women between the ages of 15
and 44) as a function of the tax value of the personal exemption,
women’s average wages, and a variety of other regressors.  They con-
firm that the dependent exemption has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on the total fertility rate.  In related work, Whittington
(1992) demonstrates that the time series finding of a statistically signif-
icant and positive link between fertility and the personal exemption
also holds in the cross section.
This subsidy to fertility does have some distributional effects, as it
is primarily geared to middle-income families.  Low-income families
often are outside of the tax system due to the zero bracket amounts and
the fact that high-income families typically do not qualify for the per-
sonal exemption. 
Another feature of the U.S. income tax code that has the potential
to increase fertility is the earned income tax credit (EITC).  Unlike the
personal exemption, the EITC is targeted to low-income women.
There is ample evidence that this credit increases labor supply, but no
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one has yet examined its possible fertility incentive.  However, because
it is a refundable tax credit for individuals who have dependent chil-
dren in the household, it has the potential to alter fertility.  It is a more
complicated subsidy than the personal exemption because although it
provides a subsidy to families with dependent children, it also
increases wage rates.  Given the regular empirical observation that
higher wages reduce fertility, the EITC may also work to reduce fertil-
ity to the extent that it increases the time cost of having children.  Thus,
any empirical study that looks at the relationship between earned
income taxes and fertility must take account of these two offsetting
effects and sort out their impact on fertility.  It is worth noting that the
potential distributional impact of this policy is quite different from the
dependent exemption because the EITC is targeted specifically to low-
income families.  It is possible, though unconfirmed empirically, that
this subsidy could provide a birth incentive to low-income families.
There are other features of the tax code that may also have an
effect on fertility.  The child and dependent care tax provides a tax
credit worth up to 30 percent of a family’s child care costs in a given
year.  The impact of this subsidy on births is indirect because in order
to be eligible for this subsidy, the family must be using some mode of
paid child care.  Also, because this subsidy lowers the cost of child
care, thus increasing wage rates and thereby labor supply, it may in
fact, like EITC, have the effect of dampening the birth rate.  To date,
there has been no research that examines this issue, though there is a
body of work that has examined the link between child care costs and
fertility.  Connelly (1991) surmises that the actual effect of the child
and dependent care tax credit on fertility is small.
Welfare and Fertility
Although some people are skeptical about whether or not eco-
nomic variables play a role in the complex decision to have a child, one
need look no further than those involved in the welfare reform move-
ment to find policymakers and voters who believe that economic
incentives can and do affect fertility.  Welfare reform has received
much recent attention since 1996, when President Clinton signed into
law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA).  This represented a large change in welfare programs.
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Prior to this time, welfare benefits were available to women with
dependent children, allowing low-income women to stay home with
their children.  But increasing out-of-wedlock births and a changing
political climate have changed society’s—and policymakers’—views
of women on welfare.  Perceptions that married women not on welfare
are increasingly opting to work full time and utilize day care services
has also contributed to the idea that poor women should not have the
option to raise their children at home while collecting welfare benefits
(Cohen and Bianchi 1999). 
When PRWORA passed, the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program (AFDC) was renamed Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF).  The TANF program was designed to deal specifi-
cally with several perceived shortcomings of the old AFDC system.
Women receiving TANF are now subject to time limits and work
requirements.  In addition, teen mothers must live with a parent or
other responsible adult to receive benefits.  Child support enforcement
was also increased.  Furthermore, states are now allowed to implement
family caps, i.e., deny an increase in monthly welfare benefits to
women who have more children while on welfare.  It is this latter pro-
vision that is the focus of my discussion. 
Under the old welfare system, in most states the monthly AFDC
payment increased with the number of children in the family.  Many
policymakers and researchers expressed concern that this encouraged
women on welfare to have more children in order to collect more
money each month.  Under TANF, states may now implement a family
cap that denies increased benefits to children born to a recipient parent.
Mandated family caps at the federal level were not instituted under
TANF primarily because abortion foes raised concerns that family caps
would encourage more abortions (Klerman 1998).  Prior to TANF,
states could apply for a federal waiver if they wanted to implement a
family cap.  New Jersey was the first to do so in 1992, and Arkansas
followed quickly.  As of July 2000, 23 states had family caps.
There have been numerous studies of the effects of AFDC on fer-
tility.  These are summarized in Moffitt (1992, 1998).  The early litera-
ture suggests only a weak link between AFDC and fertility (Moffitt
1992; Schultz 1994).  Later work, reviewed in Moffitt (1998), does
find evidence of a link between welfare payments and fertility,
although the magnitude varies widely.  Because these studies examine
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first births and do not distinguish between welfare recipients and non-
recipients, they cannot be used to assess the consequences of a family
cap.  Economists have only recently examined the potential effect of
family caps on the birth rate. 
Researchers who study family caps and fertility rely on statewide
variation in the monthly level of incremental AFDC benefits (rather
than the total benefit) to determine if there is an effect on fertility.
Because family caps only apply to women currently on welfare, it is
typical to limit the sample for analysis to those women receiving wel-
fare benefits.  One important issue that must be addressed by all
researchers looking into the effects of welfare payments on fertility is
the issue of how states choose their policies.  If policies were randomly
assigned, it would be appropriate simply to regress fertility on the
incremental benefit levels in each state, controlling for other demo-
graphic and personal characteristics of the woman.  However, policies
are not randomly assigned; they are generated by the democratic pro-
cess.  For example, states with particularly high abortion rates may
adopt policies to curb these rates.  Similarly, states with many welfare
recipients may have generous welfare benefits primarily because vot-
ers in those states believe in supporting single parents, i.e., it is not the
policy that is causing the behavior but the behavior is causing the pol-
icy.  Of course, policymakers are interested in how exogenous changes
in policy affect behavior.  Such exogenous variation in policy can be
difficult to isolate.  As Klerman (1998) states: “A crucial methodologi-
cal issue is thus how to estimate the true effect of the law while con-
trolling for persistent differences in the states adopting policies and
other social changes”  (p. 118).  The approach most often used, state
fixed effects (Moffitt 1992),  is to include a dummy variable for each
state in the model.  Often, adding state fixed effects to the model
deletes any statistically significant effect of incremental welfare pay-
ments on fertility. 
Although there is some evidence to suggest that births to recipients
may be reduced with the imposition of a family cap, many policymak-
ers are concerned about whether or not lower incremental benefits
reduce births by reducing pregnancies or by increasing abortions.
Most proponents of family caps contend that any reduction in births to
recipient mothers will be accomplished through a decrease in pregnan-
cies.  However, a reduction in births may instead result from an
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increase in abortions.  This possibility has prompted concern by the
public, the popular press, and policymakers, and as mentioned earlier,
it was one of the reasons family caps were not mandated at the federal
level (Klerman 1998).  Clearly, given the controversy surrounding
abortion in the United States, this is an important issue to research.
Klerman (1998) presents evidence from the sociology and social psy-
chology literature indicating that many teenage women will resort to
abortion when faced with the realities of PRWORA.  In other words,
rather than becoming better contraceptors, teenagers are more likely to
react to a family cap by increasing abortions.  However, researchers at
the Alan Guttmacher Institute argue that teenagers are better contra-
ceptors than many believe—their figures indicate that nearly 60 per-
cent of poor and low-income teenage women and about 75 percent of
higher-income adolescent women use some method of contraception
the first time they have sexual intercourse and that an even higher pro-
portions use it on an ongoing basis (Alan Guttmacher Institute 1998).
By exploiting state differences in payments under AFDC, Argys,
Averett, and Rees (2000) examine the link between incremental wel-
fare benefits, pregnancy, and pregnancy resolution among welfare
recipients.  We use a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) of unmarried women who received AFDC income for
at least one year between 1979 and 1991.  We estimate a bivariate pro-
bit model of the determinants of pregnancy while on AFDC and, condi-
tional on becoming pregnant, the probability of obtaining an abortion.
Estimates from our model indicate that there is no evidence that family
caps will increase abortions.  We do find some effect of family caps on
pregnancy.  The pregnancy effect is most pronounced for women with
three or more children.  Contrary to what other studies have found, we
found no difference in the responses of white, black, and Hispanic
recipients to incremental benefit levels.
However, one problem confronting any research that uses
microlevel data to examine abortions is that the incidence of abortion is
severely underreported in most survey data sets.  Several researchers
have expressed concern about underreporting of abortions in survey
data.  Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) state that white premarital teens in
the youth cohort of the NLSY report 33 percent fewer abortions than
medical records would lead one to expect.  Black teenaged women
were even less likely to report their abortions, with nearly 80 percent
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unreported.  These findings are similar to those of Jones and Forrest
(1992), who suggest that the underreporting may be related to marital
status as well as race.  Argys, Averett, and Rees (2000)  also note the
severe underreporting of abortions in the NLSY data set but note that
as long as the underreporting is not systematically related to the
explanatory variables in the model, the estimates will be unbiased.
Klerman (1998) argues that such severe underreporting makes the esti-
mation of policy effects from survey data impossible.  His review of
the available evidence of the effect of welfare reform on abortion also
indicates that there is no effect of AFDC payments on abortion.  It
should be noted that the studies he reviewed did not focus specifically
on a welfare population and so did not examine the effects of incre-
mental AFDC benefits; i.e., family caps.
Family caps are an antinatalist policy directed at low-income
women.  Although family caps apply to only a small fraction of women
in their childbearing ages, they bring up many social and political ques-
tions.  Donovan (1995) notes that despite considerable debate about
family caps, there is almost nothing known about the consequences for
the families who have another child and are denied benefits.  Will they
be able to pay their rent? Will their children go hungry?  These are also
concerns voiced by the Catholic Church (Pear 1995).  These issues
have not yet been dealt with, but welfare reform speeds ahead with
states reporting dramatic declines in their welfare caseloads (Council
of Economic Advisers, 1999).  There is considerable debate over
whether or not the declines in welfare caseloads are due entirely to
welfare reform or to the strong economy that has prevailed during the
late 1990s.  At least one study reports that an economic downturn could
increase welfare roles substantially (Black, McKinnish, and Sanders
2000).
Another policy in the United States that affects the fertility of low-
income women in a potentially antinatalist way is the money that is
allocated to family planning efforts.  In particular, the Medicaid pro-
gram subsidizes family planning for low-income women.  Surpris-
ingly, there is not much recent work on the link between Medicaid-
funded family planning efforts and fertility.  A study by Mellor (1998)
is a notable exception.  She uses data from Medicaid claims for the
state of Maryland.  Although her results are specific to Medicaid recip-
ients in Maryland, they provide some of the best evidence we have of
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the effect of federally funded family planning on the fertility of low-
income women.  Women who are on Medicaid receive family planning
services, and by federal law they pay no co-payments on prescription
family planning services or supplies (unlike women who use private
health insurance, which often does not cover items such as birth control
pills).  Mellor’s results indicate that women who are exposed to feder-
ally funded family planning through the Medicaid program have a
lower probability of having a birth.  The magnitude of the effect is
larger than that found by earlier researchers.  She argues that this is
because her method takes into account the potential correlation
between the unobservable determinants of family planning use and fer-
tility. 
It is interesting to note that policymakers have zeroed in on family
caps as an effective way to reduce the fertility of welfare recipients
despite the fact that the evidence is unclear as to whether or not family
caps are effective.  Mellor’s work suggests that an effective way to
reduce births among this population is to provide family planning ser-
vices.  Family planning programs, unlike family caps, are not discussed
as much among policymakers.
Maternity Leave and Fertility
Given the dramatic increase in the labor force participation rate of
mothers documented earlier, there has been increased policy attention
on how firms and/or government can accommodate the needs of
women for both leave time after childbirth and stable job status.  In the
United States, the debate over maternity leave largely centered around
the role of government in family decisions, and this public debate ulti-
mately led to the adoption of the federal Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) in 1993.  The FMLA guarantees 12 weeks of unpaid
parental (meaning both women and men are eligible) leave to most
employees of relatively large firms.  This offers substantial job protec-
tion to some parents following the birth of their children.  It is, how-
ever, estimated that this legislation will only pertain to about half of
U.S. workers due to coverage limitations, primarily because only firms
employing more than 50 persons are required to comply (Joesch 1995).
Further, no firms are required by law to offer paid parental leave.
Some firms did offer maternity leave (largely unpaid) prior to the pas-
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sage of the FMLA, but it has generally been a benefit offered only to
employees at large firms that pay relatively high wages (Kamerman
and Kahn 1997; Phillips 2001). 
The expansion of parental leave laws to provide coverage for all
workers, and the requirement that such leaves be compensated, remain
issues of national debate.  Advocates emphasize that the United States
is the only industrialized country that does not guarantee paid mater-
nity leave (Kamerman and Kahn 1991).   Critics argue that expanded
leave will result in higher costs for employers, as they must hire
replacement workers and/or deal with greater employee absenteeism,
and that these costs will be particularly devastating to small firms
(Trzcinski and Finn-Stevenson 1991; Kamerman and Kahn 1997).
Another cost concern is that women will be induced to have more
births because maternity leave lowers the cost of a child, and that this
increased fertility will exacerbate the financial burden on firms.  Oppo-
nents also argue that actual costs combined with employers’ fears of
increasing fertility will harm the position of women in the labor force
because employers will steer away from hiring women in their repro-
ductive years.  This could stigmatize working mothers.  To deal ratio-
nally with these concerns, it is crucial to understand whether women
increase births in response to employer-provided maternity leave.
There is a growing literature exploring the impact of maternity leave
on labor supply patterns and earnings in the United States (Phillips
2001; Waldfogel 1997a; Klerman and Leibowitz 1997, 1998).  To date,
only two papers examine the impact of maternity leave on births
among U.S. women.  The paucity of empirical work on this issue is
surprising given that the fertility concerns are an often-cited reason for
not offering such leave.
In a cross-national study on maternity leave and demographic out-
comes, Winegarden and Bracy (1995) estimate a model relating paid
maternity leave to three demographic outcomes: infant mortality rate,
labor force participation rates of women of childbearing age, and fertil-
ity.  They find that paid maternity leave decreases infant mortality rates
and raises female labor force participation.  Interestingly, despite the
fact that paid maternity leave in  many of the countries in his data set
was actually instituted as a policy to increase fertility rates, it has not
had that effect because the increase in female labor force participation
subsequently reduces fertility.  Their research underscores the impor-
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tance of considering the simultaneous nature of many demographic and
labor force decisions. 
In Averett and Whittington (2001), we model the effect of
employer-provided maternity leave on the probability of a birth for
U.S. women and find that firm-provided maternity leave can in fact
have a rather large influence on births, particularly second and higher-
order births.  We hypothesize that the temporal ordering of events
among working women is as follows.   A woman first selects her job
with or without maternity leave as a benefit.  Then, she either has a
birth or not.  Because of the waiting period often required of benefits
packages, a woman may be in a position for a year or more before hav-
ing access to maternity benefits.  It therefore seems unlikely, though
not impossible, that a woman would move into a position with mater-
nity leave because she is already pregnant.  Because maternity leave is
not a benefit explicitly available with every job or firm, women may
seek it out as a particular characteristic of their desired job just as peo-
ple may search for other job benefits such as flexible schedules, tuition
remission, or health insurance.  Determining the impact of maternity
leave on fertility therefore requires explicit recognition of this potential
sorting into jobs with maternity leave based on anticipated fertility, and
it is not as straightforward as the dependent exemption or the family
caps discussed earlier.
In order to determine the effect of maternity leave on births, we
estimate two equations: 1) the probability of a woman selecting a job
with maternity leave, and 2) the probability of having a birth.  The
probability of choosing a maternity leave job is a function of her
desired fertility, economic and social conditions in the area in which
she resides, and personal characteristics that affect her tastes, prices,
and income.  The probability of a birth is posited to be a function of her
wages, nonearned income, maternity leave, and tastes and preferences
for children.  Thus, the effect of maternity leave on fertility is actually
the sum of two effects: the indirect effect of desired fertility on the
probability of being in a maternity leave job, and the direct effect of
maternity leave on the probability of a birth. 
Maternity leave lowers the cost of a birth whether it is paid or
unpaid leave, and lowering the cost of childbirth creates a fertility
incentive.  Hoem (1990) and Walker (1991), in analyses of maternity
leave in Sweden, note that this positive incentive may be dampened if
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there is any sort of minimum work period required in order to accrue
full benefits.  If workers are required to meet a minimum term of
employment before becoming fully vested in maternity benefits, the
existence of maternity leave might actually increase the time to birth,
thereby decreasing the probability of a birth in early years.  Further, a
woman with maternity leave benefits may be a more highly valued
employee of the firm, and may have a stronger, unobserved attachment
to the labor force, making a birth less probable than for a woman with a
lower labor force attachment (and no maternity leave).  Thus, the direct
effect of maternity leave on fertility can not be determined a priori.
We estimate our model using data from the NLSY and find no evi-
dence that working women who desire children self-select into firms
offering maternity leave.  Once in a firm, however, maternity leave
does appear to directly increase the probability of a birth for working
women, at least for women with at least one child already, and the
effect is actually quite substantial.  The following calculation provides
an estimate of the potential magnitude of the effect we found.  In 1995,
the Census Bureau reported that 2,034,000 working women aged 15–
44 had births, a rate of about 5.65 percent among the roughly 36 mil-
lion working women in that age group.  If all working women were
given access to guaranteed maternity leave, the birth probability would
presumably rise only among the 23.5 percent (based on our sample)
who previously had not benefited from such a policy, and, again, likely
only for higher-order births.  Thus, increased coverage might result in
an additional 118,000 births.  This would increase the overall rough
birth probability among working women aged 15–44 to just under 6
percent, an increase of 0.4 percentage points.  Any change in the fertil-
ity or labor market behavior of women not in the labor market resulting
from expanded maternity leave policy is not included in this estimated
birth increase and, of course, as Winegarden and Bracy note, the labor
market effects have the potential to dampen the fertility effects.  In
other words, if maternity leave encourages more women to work, it
may end up decreasing births.  Because the NLSY does not collect data
on maternity leave coverage for women who are not in the labor force,
we cannot empirically test at the individual level whether or not
women who are offered maternity leave are more likely to work. 
The evidence reviewed above suggests that several public policies
in the United States influence the birth rate.  The personal exemption in
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the U.S. tax system provides a subsidy to children, and it is confirmed
that it has a positive impact on births, both in time-series and cross-sec-
tion models.  The effects of welfare payments on fertility, and specifi-
cally family caps, provide more modest evidence on the impact of
these payments on fertility.  To date there is no evidence that family
caps will increase abortions, though further study on this issue is war-
ranted.  Employer-provided maternity leave is also found to influence
the birth rate, particularly for higher-order births.  Clearly, the govern-
ment has intervened in the family.  The distributional effect of these
policies is worth noting.  The pronatalist subsidies are for the most part
geared to middle- and high-income women, while the antinatalist pro-
grams clearly target low-income women. 
The focus on fertility in welfare reform and the push to get welfare
mothers into the paid labor force, as well as continued debate about
whether the United States should mandate paid maternity leave, brings
up an often-debated issue.  Is there more that the government should do
to help women balance family and career?  In the next section, I focus
on how mothers fare in the labor force.
BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
The research reviewed above demonstrates that government policy
has the potential to impact personal decisions such as fertility.  Fertility
rates in the United States have remained fairly constant over the past
20 years, as shown earlier in Figure 1.  During this same time frame,
female labor force participation, particularly among women with
infants, has grown dramatically.  For example, in 1975, the labor force
participation rate of married women with children under one year old
was 30.8 percent.  By 1998 this number had climbed to 61.8 percent, a
growth rate of just over 100 percent.  We can expect even bigger
growth in the labor force participation of low-income women with pre-
school-aged children, as welfare reforms continue to push this group of
mothers into the labor force.  The balance between family and job
responsibilities is increasingly the focus of many researchers and poli-
cymakers. In 1989, the late Felice Schwartz wrote an article for the
Harvard Business Review where she argued that employers should put
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family-focused women on a slower career track and keep women who
viewed their careers as coming first on the fast track (Schwartz 1989).
Though she didn’t use the term “mommy track,” it quickly became a
popular buzzword.  Now, over a decade after she suggested this, there
is still debate over the merits of mommy tracking.
In recent years, the popular press in the United States has repeat-
edly profiled professional women who have elected to leave the labor
force to devote their full-time energies to child rearing.  This is an
extreme version of the mommy track, as these women supposedly elect
to leave the labor force entirely rather than to simply cut back on hours
and attempt to balance job and family responsibilities.  The conclusion
in mainstream media is often that mothers have tired of trying to be
“superwomen” and have decided that high achievement in the labor
force is not compatible with a successful home life (Deogun 1997;
Jacobs 1994; Morin 1991; Tailor 1991).  Goldin (1998) notes that for
young women with college degrees, the difficulty in balancing work
and family remains a major concern.  Others have suggested that the
relative prosperity of the 1990s has afforded women the choice to stay
home and that many career-minded professional women are exercising
their freedom to choose, i.e., they are not necessarily tired of trying to
juggle family and home life, they just want to stay home  (Quinn 2000;
Jeffrey 2000).  It is not, of course, just professional women who strug-
gle with finding a balance between work and family.  Sicherman
(1996), for example, found that a higher proportion of women than
men leave their jobs for nonmarket reasons, such as household duties
and family illness.  Culpan, Akdag, and Cindogvlu (1996), Wentling
(1996), and Gordon and Whelan (1998), among others, also present
evidence indicating that family concerns play a large role in women’s
career satisfaction, retention, and achievement.
The effect of repeated mass media articles in this vein has been to
leave the impression that women currently entering professions are less
committed to a long-term career than were women in previous decades.
This anecdotal impression can be used in some dangerous inferences
about the validity of investing in women.  Of further concern, policy-
makers could conclude that aggressive pursuit of policy options pro-
tecting women’s positions in the labor market is unnecessary.
Statistical discrimination with respect to women based on their poten-
tial labor force attachment may flourish if employers fear that a
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woman’s odds of returning to the home are greater than they were in
the past.
Interestingly, this set of articles appears at a time when the major-
ity of the empirical evidence suggests that women with children have a
heightened attachment to the labor force.  The growth in the labor force
participation rate of women has slowed in the 1990s, but there is no
reason to believe that these rates will fall.4 Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier, the labor force participation rate of mothers of preschool-aged
children has climbed more rapidly than the overall female labor force
participation rate.  Women are not only working more, they are making
inroads into traditionally male-dominated occupations.  For example,
data from the Current Population Survey indicate that in 1999, 46.7
percent of full-time wage and salary workers in executive, administra-
tive, and managerial occupations were women, up from 34.2 percent in
1983 (U.S. Department of Labor 2000).  Women are also working later
into pregnancy, and they return to work more quickly after childbirth
(Wentling 1996).  In fact, Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) report that
about half of all women return to work by the time their child is four
months old.  They also note that women returning to work closely after
the birth of a child account for nearly all of the women who will return
to work that first year.  Hayghe and Bianchi (1994) report that married
mothers are twice as likely to work full time all year than their prede-
cessors of 20 years ago.  Thus, the commitment to the workforce on the
part of mothers appears stronger than ever.
Despite the considerable anecdotal evidence surrounding this
issue, there is little empirical evidence that professional women are
leaving the workplace.  Whittington, Averett, and Anderson (2000)
examine this issue more closely, and the results of that research are
summarized here.  To determine whether or not professional women
are leaving the workforce more frequently than in years past, we use a
sample of managerial and professional women from the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics, and we estimate the probability of withdrawing
from the labor force at one-, two- and five-year intervals after the birth
of a child.  Our sample consists of married women who report that they
are working in a professional, managerial, or technical position in the
year preceding a birth during the years 1968–1992.  Because previous
research by Shapiro and Mott (1994) and Klerman and Leibowitz
(1994) highlights the importance of making the distinction between
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being employed and working, we use several definitions of withdrawal
from the labor force.   For example, many women do not withdraw
completely from the labor force after giving birth but are still
employed by their firms even though they may be out on leave.  Like-
wise, a woman might be currently out of work but still consider herself
attached to the labor market and plan to return.  The distinction
between work and employment is therefore important in understanding
women’s employment behavior following childbirth. 
It is also important to control for other factors that may affect labor
force attachment, such as earnings, work experience, and husband’s
earnings, since others have found that these factors influence whether
or not women will return to work after the birth of a child (Desai and
Waite 1991; Klerman and Leibowitz 1994).  Therefore, we regress
each measure of labor force withdrawal on the set of covariates,
described above, and control for the time period when the woman gave
birth.  Our results indicate that women who gave birth in recent years
are more likely to report zero hours of work two years after the birth of
a child when compared with women who gave birth earlier in the sam-
ple period.  Thus, we find some support for the supposition that more
professional women are opting to stay home and raise children in lieu
of aggressively pursuing their careers.  We do not find any differences
by cohort, indicating that this phenomenon cuts across women of all
childbearing ages.  However, our results are not robust across different
measures of labor force withdrawal, nor are they consistent across
postpartum time intervals.  One possible explanation for our findings is
that women of later childbirth periods may now face a more flexible
workplace that permits them to cut back on their hours or take an
extended leave, perhaps without pay, while still maintaining their
attachment to the workforce.  There is some anecdotal evidence that
this is the case and that the strong economy of the late 1990s has given
women more flexibility in the labor market (Wylie 2000). 
There is some support, albeit weak, for the conjecture that profes-
sional women are opting to leave the workforce.  Why? Several factors
have been put forth to explain this exodus.  Perhaps the most salient is
the existence of the glass ceiling.  Although women have made great
inroads in the labor market, there is still a considerable gap at the top.
Myerson and Fletcher (2000) report that women still comprise only 10
percent of senior management positions at Fortune 500 companies.
124 Averett
The data are not broken down by child status, but it is safe to say that
considerably few of the women who are senior corporate managers
have children, or at least young children. 
Another explanation for this phenomenon may be the pay differen-
tial that still exists between men and women.  Currently women earn
76 percent of what men earn.  Although women are better represented
in the top-paying occupations, within those broad occupational catego-
ries women are much less likely to be employed in the higher-paying
occupations.  For example, in the professional specialty occupations,
where women earn the most, they are much less likely to be employed
as engineers and mathematical and computer scientists and more likely
to work as teachers (except college and university) and registered
nurses (U.S. Department of Labor 2000).  The median weekly earnings
of teachers is $671 and the median earnings of registered nurses is
$739 while the median weekly earnings for engineers and mathemati-
cal and computer scientists is between $900 and $1,000 (Bowler 1999). 
What may be a more compelling reason for women with children
to opt out of the labor force may not be the gender pay gap but the fam-
ily pay gap.  The family pay gap is defined as the difference in pay
between women with and without children.  Economists have docu-
mented for many years that women with children earn less than women
without children, while this is typically not found for men.  In fact,
there is some evidence that marriage (though not necessarily children)
raises men’s earnings (Korenman and Neumark 1991).  Waldfogel
(1998) examines this issue more closely and finds that the family gap
for women has been widening at the same time the gender pay gap has
been decreasing.  For example, she notes that women without children
earned 68.4 percent of what a man earned in 1978, but that by 1994
that figure had risen to 81.3 percent.  The same figures for a woman
with children were 62.5 percent and 73.4 percent, respectively.  How-
ever, a married woman with children under the age of six earned only
67 percent of what a married man with children under the age of six
earned, while women with no children under age 18 earned 83 percent
of what a man with no children under age 18 earned.  These figures are
unadjusted for differences in human capital investment and occupation.
Thus, they may be misleading if men and women have different pro-
ductivity characteristics; i.e., it may be that women with children have
less education or less work experience on average.  However, the fam-
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ily penalty remains even when other important wage determining vari-
ables such as education, ability, previous work experience, and other
factors have been controlled. 
To provide an estimate of the magnitude of the effect of children
on men’s and women’s wages, I use data from the 1993 wave of the
NLSY.5  I use separate samples of men and women, as is typical when
estimating human capital wage functions.  Limiting my sample to high
school graduates,  I estimate a human capital earnings function, con-
trolling for the usual set of human capital, demographic, and location
variables.  One advantage of using the NLSY is that it provides infor-
mation on weekly work experience and has an ability indicator; all
respondents were administered the Armed Forces Qualifications Test
in 1980 (AFQT), which is a test of academic ability.  The dependent
variable in the analysis is the natural log of hourly earnings.  As shown
in Table 1, it is clear that the presence of a child lowers earnings by
nearly 8 percent for women and that the effect is statistically signifi-
cant.  For men, children increase their earnings by 6 percent, and the
effect is statistically significant.  These figures are even more dramatic
when I limit my analysis sample to those women and men who are in
managerial and professional occupations.  Having a child lowers a
female manager’s earnings by 15 percent while having a child has vir-
tually no impact on the earnings of a male manager.  Like Korenman
and Neumark (1991), I find married men to have higher earnings than
nonmarried men.6
Waldfogel (1998) notes that there are several theories put forth to
explain the lower earnings of mothers.  The most obvious, and the one
for which we have virtually no empirical evidence, is discrimination.
It is possible that women with children face statistical discrimination—
employers believe they are less likely to be attached to the labor force
and are thus reluctant to invest in them.  Another theory put forth by
Becker (1985) states that the earnings penalty faced by mothers is due
to lower effort.  Women with children and families exert less effort on
the job and thus earn lower wages.  If such effort is unmeasured when
estimating a human capital earnings function, the resulting wage pen-
alty may not reflect the effect of the child per se but may simply be a
difference in effort.  However, recent research that carefully accounts
for effort has generally not confirmed that this is the case (McLennan
2000).
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Table 1 Log Wage Regressions for Men and Women from 1993 NLSY
Waldfogel (1998), in her study of the family gap, notes that job-
protected maternity leave has the potential to close the family wage
gap.  She finds that women who have job protected maternity leave
experience less of a wage penalty to having children.  Waldfogel
argues that this is because maternity leave coverage raises the probabil-
ity that women return to their previous employers after childbirth.





































































































Adjusted R2 0.257 0.237 0.151 0.149
N 2,997 3,416 782 713
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  All models include controls for region of
residence (3 dummy variables) and a control for center city residence.  *** = Statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = sta-
tistically significant at the 10% level.
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Having women return to their previous employers is advantageous, she
argues, because this job continuity provides women the opportunity to
receive general and firm-specific training and work experience that
will boost their pay.  This opportunity is typically lost when a woman
has to return to a completely new employer or position following child-
birth.  She also notes that child care and other family friendly policies
also have the potential to close the family pay gap. 
CONCLUSIONS
The study of the economics of fertility has consistently found that
economic variables play an important role in determining fertility rates.
Despite experiencing below replacement level fertility, the United
States does not have any explicit policies designed to influence fertility
rates.  However, there are several public policies that affect the fertility
decisions of families.  Most of these policies are antinatalist at the low
end of the income distribution and are more pronatalist to women at the
upper end of the income distribution.  Some of these policies grew out
of concern over the high fertility rates of certain groups of the popula-
tion, such as welfare recipients.  Other policies, such as maternity
leave, were not designed to influence fertility but rather to help women
combine family and work responsibilities. 
The growing involvement of women in work outside the home has
focused attention on the status of women, particularly mothers, in the
labor force.  It is clear that working women are an entrenched feature
of the labor market.  There is evidence that family-friendly policies,
such as job-protected maternity leave, will help put them on more
equal ground economically.  Although women have made sizable
progress in the labor force, there are still barriers.  Women still earn
only 76 percent of what men earn.  They still work in female-domi-
nated jobs, and they are still underrepresented in upper management.
Women with children earn less than comparably qualified women
without children.  With many former welfare recipients poised to enter
the labor market, it is of increasing importance to examine the delicate
balance between work and family that many women must maintain.  If
professional women find the dual task of family and career daunting, it
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must seem impossible to a low-skilled woman facing the prospect of a
low-wage job and childcare costs.  For former welfare recipients,
childcare issues will be at the forefront as these women scramble to
find affordable, quality child care for their children. 
Notes
1. The total fertility rate is defined as the number of births that 1,000 women would
have in their lifetime if at each year they experienced the birth rates occurring in
the specified year.  A total fertility rate of 2.11 represents replacement level fertil-
ity at current mortality rates.
2. High teenage birth rates have been a concern of policymakers for some time in the
United States.  I do not discuss them specifically, except in the context of welfare
reform.  Readers interested in examining some of the issues should see Levine
(2000).
3. For an excellent and more technical and detailed presentation of the models, see
Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997).  For those interested in reading some of the
seminal work, see Schultz (1974).
4. Hayghe (1994) notes that although there was a break in the data between 1989 and
1991, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the labor force participa-
tion rate of women has leveled off or is going to fall.
5. Economists emphasize the simultaneous nature of the labor supply and fertility
decisions.  In these models I make no attempt to control for the endogeneity of
children.  Failure to control for this likely biases the coefficient on children
upward.  See Angrist and Evans (1998) for a model that does account for the
endogeneity of children.  See Waldfogel (1997b) for a comprehensive examina-
tion of the effect of children on women’s earnings.
6. I do not control for occupation in these models, although controlling for occupa-
tion (in models not presented here) does not reduce the child penalty.  This sug-
gests that women with children are not necessarily in lower-paying occupations.
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